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1. – Introduction 
HE AIM OF THIS ESSAY IS TO ANALYSE THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF Reagan 
Administration. In general terms, Reagan pledged to return, or advance, to 
a free market and to ―get government off our backs‖. Specifically, Reagan 
called for a massive cut in government spending, an even more drastic cut 
in taxation (particularly the income tax), a balanced budget by 1984, and a return 
to the gold standard, where money was supplied by the market rather than by 
government. In addition to a call for free markets domestically, Reagan affirmed 
his deep commitment to freedom of international trade. We would like to discuss, 
in particular, the economic measures taken during the Reagan years, showing 
some comments and critics of literature, and suggesting some concluding remarks. 
Economic policy in the 1980s may eventually become the most studied and 
hotly debated of any decade in United States history, even including the 1930s. 
Probably, the two books that represent the contrasting opinions about ―Reaga-
nomics‖ are Robert Bartley’s The Seven Fat Years (1988) – with its praise for the 
policies of the decade – and Paul Krugman’s Peddling Prosperity (1994), which con-
tains an overall critic to the economic policy implemented during the Eighties. 
Shortly after assuming the presidency, Ronald Reagan (1981) asserted that his 
proposed budget cuts for federal fiscal year 1982 were 
 
«only a first step toward reordering the relationship between citizen and government. 
[…] I know that accepting responsibility, especially for cutbacks, is not easy. But this 
package should be looked at by state and local government as a great step toward not only 
getting America moving again, but toward restructuring the power system which has led to 
economic stagnation and urban deterioration». 
 
Ronald Reagan’s advisors came to office with the intention of cutting both 
taxes and spending. But they soon found out that it was easier to achieve the first 
of these objectives than the second. The reason was simple: politics. It was popu-
lar to cut taxes. And taxes did come down substantially. The top marginal rate was 
reduced from 70 percent to 28 percent; the tax base was broadened; and many 
deductions and loopholes were eliminated. But it was unpopular to cut spending, 
and the Democratic Congress bridled at the extent of the cuts that the president 
proposed. 
T 
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2. – The economic policy during the Reagan Administration 
As Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) pointed out, thanks to Volcker’s efforts, monetary 
restraint was obtained quite early in the course of the Reagan administration. And 
Reagan’s unwavering stance in the air traffic controllers’ strike of 1981 helped 
change the tone of labor relations, indirectly contributing to the muting of infla-
tionary psychology. 
The Federal Reserve’s adoption of a more monetarist approach to policy-
making in 1979 changed the operating instrument of monetary policy, shifting it 
from interest rates to the monetary aggregates. This major shift in policy, which 
occurred in October 1979 and only two months after Volcker became Chairman 
of the Fed, marked the beginning of the disinflation effort. 
Because spending did not come down with taxes – and indeed defense spend-
ing went up sharply – and because the tax cuts did not feed back into the econo-
my to the extent hoped, both the federal debt and the annual deficit ballooned; 
and in 1981-’82, the economy was in a deep recession. 
By the end of Reagan’s first term, the Supply-Side logic was discredited in the 
eyes of many, and the inability to bring taxes and spending down together stood 
in marked contrast to Volcker’s victory over inflation. 
Between the beginning and the end of the Reagan presidency, the annual defi-
cit almost tripled. So did the gross national debt—from $995 billion to $2.9 tril-
lion. This is what Stockman (1996) defined as ―the fiscal error‖. 
The main purpose and justification for the tax reform of 1981 was to encour-
age saving by increasing returns through reduced taxation on property income 
(along with reduced taxation on other incomes) and to encourage investment 
through various tax incentives. Keynesians tend to be highly skeptical of this ap-
proach. At least in a closed economy, incentives to invest will not increase in-
vestment unless saving also rises. There are two ways saving can rise. The first is 
through higher employment and income. This path however was largely closed to 
the Reagan. 
If the decline in inflation is the most frequently mentioned gain from the eco-
nomic policy of the 1980s, the most frequently mentioned criticism was the in-
crease in the budget deficit. The full employment deficit rose as a share of GDP 
by 1.1 percentage points, from 1.6 per-cent of GDP on average in the 1970s to 
2.7 percent of GDP on average in the 1980s. Put in these terms the increase in the 
budget deficit in the 1980s seems considerably less dramatic than conventional 
wisdom would have it: more than half was inherited from the 1970s. To be sure, 
as Poterba points out, the deficit should be measured in real terms, and with the 
decline in inflation in the 1980s the real deficit was higher for any given nominal 
deficit. 
Noll and Joskow (1981) argued that economic deregulation began in 1975 and 
was almost complete by the time Reagan became president, though the Reagan 
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Administration prevented re-regulation. 
Horwich (1982) underlined as the Reaganite interpretation of American eco-
nomic history stressed the role of the individual in a decentralized decision-
making process. To the extent that property rights are secure, people and capital 
will be mobile, individuals will invest their savings, and the masses will emerge 
from poverty on a grand scale. But government, of course, did play a crucial role 
in setting and enforcing the laws of a free society, including the ground rules for 
economic transactions. This includes the preservation of competition and the in-
ternalization of externalities. 
Viscusi (1982), who criticized Reagan administration on regulation and cost-
benefit analysis, wrote: 
 
«A major failure of the Reagan regulatory reform effort is not just that such reforms 
were never achieved but that they were never attempted». 
 
Zinam (1982), in order to place Reaganomics in its proper perspective, identi-
fied two major aspects of it. One dealt with its basic economic philosophy, the 
other with some long-range structural changes which need remedial action. Philo-
sophically, Reaganomics was identified with individualism and libertarianism: eco-
nomic decisions had to be left to individuals and enterprises, since they knew best 
what was good for them, while government should have been limited only to 
those economic decisions which the former could not make for themselves. So, it 
was important shrank from over-regulating and over-controlling government. In 
Zinam’s opinion, Reaganomics was neither an attempt to return to laissez-faire, nor 
did it provide a short-run fix to improve economic performance. It did not 
represent a fully developed and integrated theory nor a new paradigm, but rather a 
point of view, a basic economic philosophy dealing with a general direction in 
which the economy was moving. 
Bartlett (1982) divided conservative critics of Reagan administration’s econom-
ic policies into three general categories: a) conservative Keynesians; b) ―Rational 
Expectations School‖; c) libertarians and ―Austrian School‖. In particular, each 
group saw the budget deficit as the most serious economic problem that US had 
in the 1980s. 
The conservative Keynesians started with a demand-side approach: so, they be-
lieved that government influenced the economy primarily through the control of 
aggregate demand, and aggregate demand was increased when the budget deficit 
increased. Yet, they didn’t sufficiently distinguish between a budget deficit caused 
by an increase in government spending or by a reduction in government revenue 
– but they tended to prefer the former solution. On the contrary, for supply-siders 
economists it made a tremendous difference whether a budget deficit resulted 
from an increasing in spending or a tax cut. When spending is increased, the gov-
ernment is preempting more goods and services from the private sector, causing a 
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―crowding-out effect‖ and higher interest rates. However, when tax rates are cut, 
the government is not expropriating more goods and services. Bartlett singled out 
six reasons for which tax cuts were preferable than higher public spending. First, 
tax rate reduction create revenues feed-back; secondly, a tax rate reduction will 
cause the so-called underground economy to shrink, and it will somewhat reduce 
the incentive to hide income from the tax collector, thereby producing some rev-
enues. Third, there will be a reduction in tax-sheltered investments and this will 
produce a revenue reflow. Fourth, a tax rate reduction will reduce incentives for 
nonproductive investments in such things as gold, paintings, rare stamps and an-
tiques. Fifth, a tax cut will produce an increase in savings. Lastly, a tax cut will 
produce some automatic spending cuts as well. 
Rational Expectationists moved from the argument that deficits were inflatio-
nary. As Miller (1980) stated 
 
«When bonds are almost identical to money, any change in policy that increases the 
deficit is inflationary». 
 
Lucas (1981), instead, took the more conventional view that deficits, however 
they are caused, put pressure on the Fed to monetize the debt, thereby causing in-
flation. 
Miller and Struthers (1980) argued: 
 
«Federal bonds are nothing more than an alternative form of currency – they are 
promises to deliver currency in the future. Like currency, these bonds are pieces of paper 
backed by nothing tangible; they are flat paper. Like currency they are a debt that the 
government never promises to retire. They are, in all essentials, a part of our ever-
expanding money supply». 
 
Bartlett (1982) criticized these assumptions, because he reputed that there were 
essential differences between the government’s bond and currency. In fact, bonds 
imply a stream of future interest payments, that will be financed either by future 
taxes or by additional deficits. 
Austrian School critics of Supply-Side Economics concerned increasing deficit 
spending. According Austrian economists, Supply-Side Economics and his ―Laf-
fer curve‖ was another way of increasing government revenues. As Cowen (1980) 
argued: 
 
«The most serious drawback of the Laffer curve is that it may be used for the purpose 
of maximizing government revenue». 
 
And Ebeling (1980) wrote: 
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«The infighting and emotional hysteria in Congress over the Kemp-Roth Bill is noth-
ing more than the politicians and the special interests arguing over whether the proposed 
tax cut will or will not supply the government with ever greater sums to dole out to friends 
and favorites of the political court». 
 
R. G. Anderson (1980) considered Supply-Side Economics as the just obverse 
of Keynesianism, substituting government control of supply for control of aggre-
gate demand. Sennholz (1980) wrote on this argument: 
 
«Some of these supply-side advocates want merely to substitute the collectivist Keyne-
sian blueprint with their own, and replace the demand-side tinkerers in Washington with 
a new team of collectivist supply-side tinkerers». 
 
Danziger (1983) showed that Reagan transfer programs significantly reduced 
poverty, but that welfare accounts for only a small proportion of this reduction. 
He underlined that non-whites were not more likely to be dependent on cash 
transfers than whites, but that they were more likely to be dependent on welfare. 
Increased welfare, however, cannot reduce poverty, increase work effort, and con-
tain the welfare rolls. President Reagan’s welfare reform reduced the ―Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children‖ (AFDC) case loads and increased poverty for 
many welfare recipients who were mixing work and welfare. The Reagan program 
assumed that those who remain poor will be better off waiting for economic 
growth to trickle down from those above them rather than relying on welfare and 
public jobs programs. 
Buchanan (1985) suggested that there was nothing particularly new or deplora-
ble about Reagan’s deficit because in any democratic government the budget-
making process has a built-in bias toward deficit. 
Marris (1985) suggested that paradoxically, ―Reaganomics‖ has, by now, 
created the potential for a ―Reagan miracle‖ in Europe and Japan of the kind en-
joyed by the United States in the period 1983-84. These nations could give them-
selves a fairly large dose of fiscal expansion and set off a strong rise in domestic 
demand, while inflation would be held down because their currencies would be 
appreciating, and budget deficits would not crowd out investment because their 
savings would (ex ante) be flowing back from the United States. 
Poterba’s paper (1987) showed that tax receipts as a share of GDP remained 
roughly constant during the 1980s equaling 18.9 per-cent of GDP in 1979 and 
19.2 percent of GDP in 1989. So, the increase in the deficit during this period was 
due to spending in-creases, rather than to tax decreases. 
As Modigliani (1988) stated, beginning with 1979 and up to 1982, a case can be 
made that the Fed was adhering to a monetarist course. Furthermore, during these 
years the M1 growth target did tend to decline gradually. But even during this pe-
riod there are many aspects of the Fed’s behavior that cannot be reconciled with 
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monetarism and instead fit the hypothesis of GNP targeting. Moreover, through-
out the years 1979-82, the actual growth of M1 exceeded the target growth, except 
for 1981. 
Considering the fiscal policy, according Modigliani (1988) the deficit resulted 
from the large personal and business tax cuts which Reagan pushed through Con-
gress, particularly the so-called ―Kemp-Roth Act‖ of August 1981. The measure 
was designed to cut personal income tax rates by roughly one-quarter over a 
three-year period. 
The central features of the 1981 Economic Recovery and Tax Act (ERTA) and 
1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) were to: 1) Phase in re-
duction of marginal personal rates (including bracket indexing by 1985); 2) Re-
duce the top-bracket rate of 70 percent on investment income to 50 percent; 3) 
Adopt the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and extend the investment 
tax credit (ITC); 4) Adopt universal Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs); 5) 
Implement the incremental Research and Development Tax Credit. 
The 1986 tax reform was extremely complex. Its most important features were: 
1) Lowering personal and corporate income tax rates (to a maximum of 28 per-
cent and 34 percent, respectively); 2) A substantial shift (amounting to about $120 
billion over the next five years) of the tax burden from the individual to the cor-
porate tax; 3) Elimination of the investment tax credit (a feature common to all 
the major reform proposals); 4) Much slower depreciation schedules; 5) Stiff al-
ternative minimum tax for corporations. (to insure that no corporation that re-
ports current profits to its shareholders will avoid paying taxes);16 6) The tax de-
ductibility of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) will be income-tested, and 
other tax-deferred retirement accounts (like 401(k) plans) will limit the amounts 
that individuals can contribute; 7) Capital gains will be taxed in full as ordinary in-
come, with no inflation adjustment for the basis of the asset; 8) Extension of the 
research and development (R&D) tax credit to December 1988 with tightened eli-
gibility and a reduction in the rate from 25 percent to 20 percent; 9) Elimination 
of tax deductibility of consumer debt; 10) Various other changes in accounting 
rules, industry-specific items, and the personal tax base (for example, state and lo-
cal sales taxes will no longer be deductible, the personal exemption is increased, 
and income averaging is eliminated). 
Modigliani suggested a suggestive interpretation of fiscal policy results: Reagan 
was pretty successful in achieving one part of his economic program Supply Side 
Economics-cutting taxes, and offsetting the loss of revenue by cutting non-
defense expenditure. Both declined by somewhat over 10 percent-an impressive 
accomplishment considering the rising trend of earlier years in expenditure and 
personal taxes. Unfortunately this part of the program collided with another-the 
ambitious major escalation of defense outlays which, despite much opposition, re-
sulted in a 20 percent rise in the GNP share of defense. This program Reagan left 
unfunded, being unwilling to accept higher taxes as a way to pay and unwilling 
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and/or unable to cut non-defense any more deeply against a divided Congress. 
Because the rise in defense was unfunded it gradually increased the debt and thus 
the interest on the debt. 
So, Modigliani concluded that of the many goals that the Reagan Administra-
tion had set for itself, only one was achieved reasonably closely, that of wringing 
inflation out of the economy. This was unquestionably a significant success, both 
because it fulfilled a commitment and because unaccustomed inflation, once it 
approaches the two-digit range, has numerous and non-negligible cost. One other 
target that the Administration has at least partly achieved is retrenchment in non-
defense, non-Social security expenditures. This achievement is significant especial-
ly when compared with the earlier rising trend. But it was largely accomplished by 
means of tax cutting and the pressure of a mounting deficit. 
Boskin (1988) wrote that the 1981 tax cuts were implemented at the beginning 
of a substantial disinflation. Since it was clear a recession would result, it was un-
reasonable to expect an investment boom as demand fell, inventories accumu-
lated, and capacity utilization rates plummeted. Some concluded from this that the 
―Supply-Side‖ tax cuts had failed, a conclusion which is no more justified than the 
counter assertion that the investment boomlet of 1983-84 was due entirely to the 
tax changes. Nevertheless, the tax changes did play an important role, as the in-
vestment boom occurred even in the face of inordinately high real interest rates 
over the period. He concluded: 
 
«The lesson of the 1980s is not that we should dramatically change the new tax laws 
but rather that we should build on their accomplishments: broaden the tax base to include 
more consumption while preserving low marginal tax rates and restoring carefully targeted 
incentives for saving and investment». 
 
Sachs (1988) pointed out the relation between fiscal deficit and external deficit 
of the country, calculating that an increase of a 1.0% in the fiscal deficit meant a 
deterioration of the current account balance of 0.66%. Other studies also found 
that shifts in U.S. and foreign fiscal policies accounted for over half of the widen-
ing of the U.S. external deficit. 
Smyth and Dua (1988) estimated the public’s indifference map between infla-
tion and unemployment by an econometric analysis of an index of the public’s rat-
ing of President Reagan’s macroeconomic policy. The indifference map obtained 
was markedly nonlinear so that the public’s trade-off between inflation and un-
employment varied greatly with the relative rates of inflation and unemployment. 
A particular change in inflation or unemployment changed the President’s rating 
much more when inflation and unemployment were high than when they were 
low. If the unemployment rate was close to its natural level, there was little incen-
tive for a President to force down inflation to a rate close to zero. 
Tabellini and La Via (1989) moved from two central findings: 1) during the pe-
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riod 1955-1985 the burden of stabilizing public debt fell exclusively on the fiscal 
authority; 2) Democratic administrations have systematically pursued more expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policies than Republicans administrations. Their paper 
estimated the monetary policy reaction function jointly with the fiscal policy reac-
tion function and with the law of motion of public debt. These estimates revealed 
the policymakers’ attitudes towards the goal of stabilizing the path of public debt. 
The results shown that in the U.S. during the years 1955-’85 this goal had been 
pursued by the fiscal authority but not by the central bank. Hence, monetary poli-
cy, and not fiscal policy, seemed to be dominant in U.S. regime of that period. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggested that monetary and fiscal policy were 
influenced by political variables: so Democratic administrations had systematically 
pursued more expansionary policies than Republican administrations. 
Considering the inflation problem, President Reagan (1981) explained: 
 
«above all bringing government spending back within government revenues, which is 
the only way, together with increased productivity, that we can reduce and, yes, eliminate 
inflation». 
 
Orzechowski (1989) searched to demonstrate that a collective rebate can be an 
effective tool to reduce excessive government. The idea was that the general pub-
lic can be aroused to vote for and support political agendas that reduce govern-
ment intervention. Bunching many pro-competitive policies in one package (a col-
lective rebate) offered an opportunity to turn the public against the special inter-
ests. 
An attempt was made to extend the collective rebate principle to the fiscal pol-
icy employed by the Regan administration. With all of its faults notwithstanding, it 
was shown that this fiscal policy could be interpreted as a successful application of 
the collective rebate principle. 
Throop (1991) moved from the point that the national debt nearly tripled dur-
ing the Reagan Administration. One widely held view is that the extra spending 
that was financed by the issuance of federal debt during the Reagan years was 
generally used for consumption, rather than investment, and as a result a burden 
was placed on future generations. This burden takes the form of a lower capital 
stock, and therefore lower production and incomes in the future, to the extent 
that the expenditures that were financed by the debt issue ―crowded out‖ private 
capital formation. Alternatively, it takes the form of increased indebtedness to fo-
reigners (without an offsetting increase in the economy’s capital stock) to the ex-
tent that inflows were attracted from abroad. In this case, the economy’s capital 
stock, and hence production and incomes in the future, are not reduced, but the 
economy’s absorption of future output must decline in order to service the debt 
to foreigners. An alternative view of the reason for rising indebtedness to foreign-
ers during the Reagan years is that investment opportunities in the U.S. improved, 
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not only because of the tax cuts for business but also as a result of deregulation 
and a reduced risk of government intervention. Testing a macro-econometric 
model for the ―Barro-Ricardo Equivalence‖, Throop found out that the errors in 
the consumption function during the Reagan years were not atypically large, and 
they appear to be more closely related to the business cycle than to a Ricardian re-
sponse to budget deficits. The total economic burden that fiscal policy in the Rea-
gan years placed on future generations is estimated as equivalent to either a lump 
sum payment equal to 9 percent of the nation’s current GNP or an annual pay-
ment equal to 0.4 percent. 
Aguado (1992) underlined several reasons why the economic growth wasn’t as 
high as it was expected, and didn't surpass the results of other recent periods of 
economy expansion in the United States. One of them has to do with the low rate 
of productivity growth in the country; another, with the process of deindustriali-
zation taking place in the United States in those years. It can be said that both rea-
sons are interdependent, as the US is becoming more and more a country specia-
lized in Services whose rate of productivity growth is very low. 
Moreover, Aguado explained U.S. growth rate during the ’80s emphasizing the 
role of savings and investments. Concerning the individual savings rate, the Unit-
ed States citizens saved, in 1980, 7.1% of their disposable income and, in 1987, 
they only saved 3.8%. This decrease in family savings added to the ―dissaving‖ of 
the public sector made national savings, that decrease from 16.2% of the GNP in 
1980 to only 12.4% of the GNP in 1986. The OECD, in fact, designated in 1986 
the United States as the country with the lowest national saving rate among the 24 
countries that constitute the organization. 
When studying the behavior of net investment, we see that an important dete-
rioration has taken place: during the fifties net investment as a percent of GNP 
was 7.0%; during the sixties the figure was 7.1%; during the seventies, 6.7% and 
during the eighties the figure dropped to the level of 4.7%. A reason for this could 
be the increased depreciation of the existing stock of capital in1980s, probably be-
cause this became of shorter duration; another possible explanation concerns the 
high real interest rates of the country's recent history. 
Finally, considering the inequality problems, Aguado stated: 
 
«Another subject to be discussed […] is that related to income distribution. Different 
data on this issue show a deteriorating situation that probably began in the mid 70’s and 
worsened during the eighties. During the Reagan presidency seems to have been true the 
slogan used by Governor Dukakis in his electoral campaign, that the rich had become 
richer, the poor poorer and the middle class was squeezed in between». 
 
According to Feldstein (1994), President Reagan either hoped that the deficit 
would decline as the economy grew or else thought that spending cuts would 
eventually be made. Hence, an increase in taxes as a share of GDP was not viewed 
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as either necessary or desirable. Feldstein also argued that the supply side argu-
ment that tax cuts would pay for themselves was a factor in the optimism. 
Feldstein argued that the effort to stabilize exchange rates under the ―Plaza 
Agreement‖ interfered with domestic monetary policy in Japan and the United 
States, and it also led to policies in the United States which were too tight. 
The analysis by Martin Anderson in Revolution (1988), his memoir on Reagan’s 
economic policy, took a different view from that of Feldstein. 
From a libertarian perspective, Rothbard (1994) strongly criticized Reagan 
economic policies and the ―Myths of Reaganomics‖. In cutting government ex-
penditure, in 1980, the last year of free-spending Jimmy Carter the federal gov-
ernment spent $591 billion. In 1986, the last recorded year of the Reagan Admin-
istration, the federal government spent $990 billion, an increase of 68%. A better 
comparison would be percentage of federal spending to net private product, that 
is, production of the private sector. That percentage was 31.1% in 1980, and 
34.3% in 1986. So even using percentages, the Reagan Administration has brought 
us a substantial increase in government spending. Moreover, in Rothbard’s opi-
nion there was never much difference between Reagan’s and Congress’s budgets. 
So, the result of this failure has to impute to the President’s measures. 
But, for Rothbard, the most embarrassing failure of Reaganomics goals is the 
public deficit. Jimmy Carter habitually ran deficits of $40-50 billion and, by the 
end, up to $74 billion; but by 1984, when Reagan had promised to achieve a ba-
lanced budget, the deficit had settled down comfortably to about $200 billion. 
This was by far the largest budget deficit in American history (probably overcame 
by the Obama’s one). 
Also the tax cuts of 1981 were attacked by Rothbard. It’s true that tax rates for 
higher-income brackets were cut; but for the average person, taxes rose, rather 
than declined. 
As a conclusion, Rothbard described referring to monetary and fiscal policy, 
the Democrats as the classic party of liberal Keynesianism, in contrast to the Re-
publican policy of conservative Keynesianism, with little differences between them. 
As Taylor (1995) pointed out, one could also say increased taxes were not 
raised to cover the increased spending on defense and entitlement pro-grams. 
Thus, whether lower taxes or higher spending ―caused‖ the deficit depends on 
your perspective. Another crucial point concerns the possible role played by ―Bar-
ro-Ricardo Equivalence Theorem‖ in this question. In the Taylor’s view, there 
was an overriding de-sire on the part of Reagan to keep tax receipts from rising as 
a share of GDP. With the absence of the 1981 tax cuts it would have failed in this 
goal. 
Taylor explained that monetary policy in 1986 and 1987 in the United States 
was probably too easy on average rather than too tight. The boom in the United 
States in 1987 and 1988 got too far out of control; it eventually led to a typical 
boom-bust cycle. 
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Moreover, Volcker’s comments on the ―Plaza Agreement‖ are particularly in-
teresting in that he claims the Accord had no implication for U.S. monetary policy 
either explicit or implicit. 
Richardson gave a somewhat negative assessment of trade policy during the 
Reagan Administration: 
 
«U.S. trade policy in the 1980s seems on balance to have become mildly more restric-
tive» (Richardson, p. 655). 
 
Clearly, the expansion of voluntary restraint agreements increased congression-
al activism. 
However, according Taylor, the initiation of the Canadian-United States free 
trade agreement – though not the ideal multilateral approach – must on balance 
be considered a positive development. And the Uruguay Round started during the 
Reagan Administration was taken up with enthusiasm by both the Bush and the 
Clinton Administrations. 
In his speech to a ―Center of the American Experiment‖, Kudlow (1998) un-
derlined as Reagan legacy was a living legacy. Its spirit, principles, and ideas were 
the dominant influence on both political parties, during the 1990s. He remem-
bered the crucial importance of the Kemp-Roth tax cut bill, which later evolved 
down to the flat-tax reform of 1986. The top rate was reduced, in steps, from 70 
percent to 28 percent, which spurred economic growth. The expansion of the 
1980s lasted over seven years and created roughly 20 million new jobs. The econ-
omy grew at a 4 percent annual rate and the inflation rate was just over 3 percent. 
The unemployment rate was taken down from a peak of 11 percent to about 5.3 
percent at its lowest point. 
Moreover, Kudlow suggested how the ―Laffer curve‖ goody worked – as the 
dynamic of real revenues showed –, and he also underlined a strategic use of debt. 
In addition, Kudlow remarked that an unintended aspect of Reagan’s policies was 
the extraordinary explosion of this information-age high technology that has be-
come the backbone of the economy in the 1990s. It started really in the mid- to 
late 1970s, but so many of the new computing devices, both hardware and soft-
ware, that were developed in the 1970s were not sufficiently commercialized, 
brought to market, and distributed until the 1980s. 
According to Médaille (2007), the properly name that we should give to Rea-
gan economic policies had to evaluate four goals of his administration. First, gov-
ernment spending: whether in absolute terms or in percentages, the Reagan ad-
ministration had brought us a substantial increase in government spending. 
Second, taxes: despite the much touted tax cuts of 1981, taxes for the average per-
son actually rose, and they rose every year thereafter. Of course, they weren't 
called ―tax increases‖, they were instead called ―fees‖ or ―plugging loopholes‖; but 
the effect was the same. Third, balanced budgets: in 1980, the debt of the United 
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States was $712 billion; when Reagan left office, it was over $2 trillion; when the 
elder G. Bush left office, it was $3 trillion. This kind of borrowing was also a tax 
increase, but an increase on future generations; Americans spend ourselves into 
prosperity by taking the money from their children. Fourth, government regula-
tion: the Reagan administration took credit for the deregulation of the airline and 
trucking industries, but in fact this happened, or were begun, under the Carter 
administration. All that extra money the Reagan Administration was spending 
went, in fact, to a larger and more intrusive government. 
As the Table 1 below shows, during the period 1981-1988 investment, gov-
ernment and consumption share of real GDP per capita remained substantially 
constant, with moderate fluctuations. The total expenditure of general govern-
ment (measured as percentage of GDP) rose of 1.7% from 1981 to 1988, especial-
ly due to the increase of defense spending. 
 
Tab. 1 – Some Macroeconomic Fundamentals during the Reagan years (U.S.A., 1980-
1990). 
Year Investment 
share a 
Government 
share b 
Consumption 
share c 
Govern-
ment 
expendi-
ture d 
Public 
debt e 
Misery 
Index f 
1980 22.00 11.05 66.83 34.2 43.9 20.608 
1981 23.04 10.92 66.01 34.5 41.5 17.915 
1982 20.46 11.51 68.40 36.9 46.4 15.861 
1983 21.14 11.33 68.79 37.1 49.5 12.813 
1984 24.64 10.75 66.85 36.1 51.2 11.816 
1985 23.90 10.95 67.63 36.8 56.1 10.761 
1986 23.27 11.20 68.18 37.3 59.5 8.859 
1987 23.10 11.14 68.21 37.1 61.3 9.941 
1988 22.60 10.90 68.25 36.2 62.3 9.509 
1989 22.88 10.67 67.76 36.2 62.6 10.127 
1990 22.10 10.77 68.07 37.2 64.3 10.898 
Notes: a: Investment Share of Real GDP per capita; b: Government Share of Real GDP per ca-
pita; c: Consumption Share of Real GDP per capita; d: Total Expenditure General Government,% 
GDP; e: General Government Consolidate Public Debt,% GDP; f: Sum of Consumer price index 
and Unemployment rate. 
Sources: Penn World Table (PWT 6.3) data, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/index.html, and FRED 
database, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
 
Instead, the public debt increased by 20.8 percentage point; yet, as the dynamic 
of public expenditure clarifies, the explosion of debt was a result of the deteriora-
tion of public revenue rather than the increase of public spending. 
Finally, Misery Index declined constantly during Reagan administration, from 
17.92% to 9.51%, with a sharp reduction in comparison to the Seventies. 
Moreover, the Figure 1 presented below suggests that the yield curve fluc-
tuated more or less about 2%, after a strong increase in 1981, while the growth 
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rate, after a sharp decline in 1982, boomed in 1983-’84, and after that it increased 
by 2.5-3 percentage point. The unemployment rate dynamic reflected the overall 
economic conditions, showing an increase during the period 1981-’83, after which 
it permanently declined. 
 
Fig. 1 – Growth rate, Unemployment, Interests rate and Trade Balance during the 1980s 
(U.S.A., 1980-1990). 
 
Source: our elaborations. 
 
As we can notice, in 1980 growth rate and yield curve were negative, the un-
employment rate and government share were over their 1988 values, while in-
vestment share was under its 1988 value. During the first two years of G. Bush Sr. 
administration, growth rate, investment share, government share and consump-
tion share decreased in respect to 1988, whereas government expenditure and 
public debt heightened. 
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STATA 10. Data from AMECO database, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/
American Macroeconomic Performance during the 1980s
The Economic Policy of Ronald Reagan 
COSIMO MAGAZZINO 
 
- 15 - 
3. – The augmented IS-LM model during the Reagan years 
In this section we will discuss a simple IS-LM model augmented for inflation, dur-
ing the Reagan years. The data has been derived from FRED database, by Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All series contains quarterly data, from 1981q1 to 
1989q1. 
In Table 2 variables of the model are summed up. 
 
Tab. 2 – List of variables used in our IS-LM model. 
Variable Explanation 
R Interest Rate - 3 months Treasury-Bill 
M M2, mld $ 
P GDP Price Deflator, 1987=100 
Y Real GDP at constant price (1987=100), mld $ 
Sources: FRED database. 
 
In Table 3 some preliminary descriptive statistics are shown. 
 
Tab. 3 – Exploratory data analysis. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
R 8.5827 8.1067 2.7819 0.9888 3.0946 9.7 
M 2403.681 2421.3 458.5094 -0.0785 1.7035 1430.93 
P 0.9244 0.9333 0.0838 -0.1375 2.0333 0.3039 
Y 4218.888 4221.8 344.8901 0.1150 1.7358 1063.2 
Sources: our calculations. 
 
Economists sometimes called these models as RMPY, due to the name of va-
riables included in it. Above all, we obtained log transformation of the series. 
Then, we applied time-series techniques on stationarity and unit root process, in 
order to check some stationarity properties. Table 4 contains results of common 
unit root tests, for all variables. 
 
Tab. 4 – Results for stationarity tests. 
Variable Stationarity tests 
ADF ERS PP KPSS 
R NS: -1.047 NS: -1.299 NS: -1.935 NS: 0.192 
M TS: -3.835 NS: -0.344 TS: -3.467 NS: 0.389 
P TS: -5.177 NS: -1.587 TS: -4.897 NS: 0.242 
Y TS: -5.423 TS: -6.274 NS: -2.916 NS: 0.101 
Notes: NS: Non Stationary; TS: Trend Stationary. 
Source: our calculations. 
 
The second column presents results for Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
test; the third one for Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1992) test; the fourth col-
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umn contains results for Phillips and Perron (1988) test; at last, in the fifth col-
umn there are results for Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) test. In-
terest rate (R) seems to be clearly non stationary, while for money supply (M) and 
price levels (P) we obtained ambiguous results; in fact, for two out of four tests 
these variables are trend-stationary (ADF and PP), while according to the remain-
ing tests they are non stationary. Analogous results we reached for the output (Y). 
The lag-order selection has been conducted with the following statistics: final 
prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion 
(HQIC). They all selected a model with two lags. 
Cointegration tests has been subsequently applied, in order to be able to find 
the long-run relationship among the variables. As is shown in Table 5, Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) cointegration method suggests that there might be two cointe-
grating relationships among variables. In fact, the trace statistic and the maximum-
eigenvalue statistic reject r=1 in favour of r=2 at the 5% critical value. As in the 
lag-length selection problem, choosing the number of cointegrating equations that 
minimizes either the SBIC or the HQIC provides a consistent estimator of the 
number of cointegrating equations. Yet, both these criteria suggest a rank=2 for 
our data. 
 
Tab. 5 – Results for cointegration tests. 
Johansen and Juselius procedure 
Rank = 2 
Trace statistic: 9.9551 
5% Critical Value: 15.41 
Log-Likelihood: 447.8458 
Rank = 2 
Maximum-eigenvalue statistic: 9.4951 
5% Critical Value: 14.07 
Rank = 2 
SBIC: -24.4145 
HQIC: -25.9392 
AIC: -26.6564 
Source: our calculations. 
 
Equations 1 and 2 sum up the two cointegrating relationships. 
 
lnR = -19.5598 lnP +1.9653 lnY +.1740 t -22.2230 (1) 
          (3.0259)          (0.7474)        (0.0334)  (0.0000)  
lnM = 1.0975 lnP -1.1128 lnY -0.0179 t +1.7847 (2) 
          (0.4907)           (0.2833)       (0.0054)    (0.0000)  
 
The likelihood-ratio test of the over-identifying restrictions does not reject the 
null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid. A Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals of Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) clari-
fies as at the 5% level we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals for the orders 1,…,12 tested. Checking the eigenvalue 
stability condition in a VECM, the eigenvalues of the companion matrix lie inside 
the unit circle, and the real roots are far from 1. The Jarque and Bera results 
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present statistics for each equation and for all equations jointly against the null 
hypothesis of normality. For our model, results do not suggest non-normality. 
The underlying VAR(2) produces the estimates shown in Table 6 below. 
 
Tab. 6 – Results for VAR(2) estimates for a RMPY model (USA). 
 Dep. var.: ΔR Dep. var.: ΔM Dep. var.: ΔP Dep. var.: ΔY 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Constant -0.693*** 0.110 0.040*** 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.010 
Trend 0.012*** 0.002 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
ΔRt-1 -0.052 0.135 -0.032** 0.012 0.002 0.006 -0.034*** 0.012 
ΔMt-1 4.762** 1.886 -0.036 0.171 -0.018 0.078 0.364** 0.163 
ΔPt-1 0.539 3.749 -0.303 0.339 0.343** 0.155 -0.889*** 0.324 
ΔYt-1 5.471 2.090 0.173 0.189 0.166* 0.087 0.101 0.181 
ΔRt-2 -0.516*** 0.158 -0.026* 0.014 -0.003 0.007 -0.013 0.014 
ΔMt-2 0.721 1.723 -0.238 0.156 0.111 0.072 -0.036 0.149 
ΔPt-2 23.085*** 4.235 -0.204 0.383 0.299* 0.175 -0.088 0.366 
ΔYt-2 5.353*** 1.513 -0.035 0.137 -0.067 0.063 0.350*** 0.131 
RMSE 0.0682 0.0062 0.0028 0.0059 
R2 0.6948 0.6555 0.4842 0.6647 
AIC -25.5842 
HQIC -24.9865 
SBIC -23.7160 
Log-Lik. 423.7632 
FPE 1.01e-16 
Source: our calculations. 
 
With regard to residuals’ autocorrelation, since we cannot reject the null hypo-
thesis that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals for any of the twelve orders 
tested, the LM test gives no hint of model mis-specification. Moreover, in test for 
normally distributed disturbances, neither the single-equation Jarque and Bera sta-
tistic nor the joint one come close to rejecting the null hypothesis of normality. 
Checking the stability condition, since the modulus of each eigenvalue is strictly 
less than 1, the estimates satisfy the required condition. Indeed, obtaining Wald 
lag-exclusion statistics, the equations of money supply and price deflator appear to 
have a different lag structure from that of interest rate and real GDP. In fact, in 
the first two equations, we cannot reject the null that these two endogenous va-
riables have zero coefficients at the second lag. In contrast, in the others two equ-
ations, the coefficients on the second lag of the endogenous variables are jointly 
significant. However, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
first lag of the endogenous variables are zero in all four equations. Similarly, we 
can also strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the first and on the 
second lag of the four endogenous variables are zero in all equations jointly. 
Table 5 shows that growth rate is influenced by its second lag, but also by first 
lag of interest rate, money supply, and price deflator. These results are in line with 
Keynesian view, since money can influence real aggregates, so that non-neutrality 
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principle would be disavowed. Granger-causality tests confirm these findings: 
money supply, price deflator, and output Granger-cause interest rate; interest rate 
Granger-causes money supply; while interest rate and price deflator Granger-
cause real GDP. Moreover, all endogenous variables jointly Granger-cause the in-
terest rate. Likewise, money supply and real output are Granger-caused by the 
others three endogenous variables. So, we have another reassurance in favour of 
money’ non-neutrality hypothesis. Our results agree with that of in Koop (2004), 
in spite of this study concerns a wider period (1947q1-1992q4). 
Finally, Impulse-Response Functions (IRF) and Forecast Error Variance De-
composition (FEVD) suggest analogous conclusions, since the variance of interest 
rate is above all due to shocks on interest rate itself, and in minor part to output 
shocks (in the medium-long run). 
 
Tab. 7 – Results for Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of output (USA). 
Step impulse = R 
response = Y 
impulse = M 
response = Y 
impulse = P 
response = Y 
impulse = Y 
response = Y 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 .134592 .039305 .003309 .822794 
2 .272912 .127876 .013553 .585659 
3 .24441 .164596 .012125 .578868 
4 .181729 .179679 .009262 .629329 
5 .151171 .18165 .007161 .660017 
6 .145148 .179487 .005772 .669593 
7 .148436 .176544 .004843 .670177 
8 .154492 .173627 .004178 .667703 
9 .160766 .171102 .003684 .664448 
10 .166334 .169073 .003308 .661285 
11 .171041 .167465 .003013 .658481 
12 .175001 .166168 .002776 .656055 
Source: our calculations. 
 
Indeed, money supply’ variance is due to its own shocks, either in the short-
run or in the medium-long one, besides for price deflator. For output (Table 7), 
we can conclude that its variability is determined, in the medium-long run, by 
shocks to output itself, but also – although in a residual and increasing way – by 
shocks to interest rate, money supply, and price deflator. 
4. – Conclusions 
The Reagan Administration was characterized, in the first place, by an important 
recession (the GNP, in 1982, dropped by 2.5%), followed later by an economic 
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expansion that still lasted into the ’90s. 
In the period from 1973 to 1986, employment grew in the US to the order of 
28%, compared with 11% growth in Japan and null growth in the EEC. Since 
1970 more than 30 million jobs had been created in the United States, while in 
Europe the employment figure came to a standstill during the same period. 
The balance of payments on current account in the United States turned out to 
be, on average during the fifties, positive, and of the order of 0.1% in relation to 
the GNP. During the sixties, the average annual balance was still positive and of 
the order of 0.5% of the GNP. During the seventies the average was 0.0%, what 
meant that, on average, the balance on current account was balanced in that diffi-
cult decade. Since 1981, however, there has been a drastic change in tendency by 
which the annual average of the balance on current account had been, as a percen-
tage of the GNP, -2.1%. 
The consequence of the continuous deficits of the balance of payments during 
the Reagan Administration had been that the United States passed, in a very few 
years, from being a creditor country in the international markets, to being the 
country with the largest net external debt. This had also negative effects on public 
expenditure, because the ―twin deficits‖ phenomenon and the higher interest rates 
leaded to an increasing of interest payments. 
The most important imbalances and costs that the Reagan economic policies 
generated are two: the tremendous fiscal deficits, which increased the internal 
debt to levels never reached, and the not less important deficits in the balance of 
payment which have catapulted the U.S. to the first place in the ranking of coun-
tries with foreign debt. 
As regard to econometric results, our IS-LM model augmented for inflation 
shows how, using Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis quarterly data, between 1981 
and 1989 we might reject hypothesis of non-neutrality of money, so that money 
seems to have real effects. 
We may, finally, synthesize the Reagan economic legacy in the following way, 
according to its positive and negative outcomes: in the negative aspect, the legacy 
of fiscal deficit; the persistence of very high real interest rates, with their negative 
impact on the cost of capital in the country itself and with their negative conse-
quences on the economies of other countries; the legacy of a huge balance of 
payment deficits which, in a very short period of time, converted the United 
States into the world’s largest debtor, once having been the largest creditor; and 
finally, the inability to stop and reverse the secular deterioration of three relevant 
variables of the American economy, such as the drop in personal savings, the low 
growth of productivity and the worsening of the income distribution. 
On the positive side, there are four things that must be pointed out: first, the 
control of inflation, from the two-digit figures of the beginning of the eighties to 
figures that averaged 4%; in the second place, the creation of employment, even if 
a major part of it was created in the services sector and with very low remunera-
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tion; third, the strong reduction of Misery Index, from 17.9% to 9.5%; and last, 
but probably the most important point, the new vision that Ronald Reagan sug-
gested about government size and free market possibilities. 
 
References 
Aguado S. (1992), ―Reaganomics: Ten Years Later‖, Revista Española de Estudios 
Norteamericanos, a. III, N. 5, pp. 70-76. 
Aguado S. (1990), ―El legado económico del presidente Reagan‖, ICE-Revista de e-
conomía, N. 684-685, pp. 127-140. 
Aguado S. (1989), ―La Politica Económica de Reagan en Perspectiva‖, Economistas, 
a. VII, N. 40, October-November, pp. 62-67. 
Anderson M. (1988), Revolution, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego. 
Anderson R. G. (1980), ―Supply-Side Economics: Miracle Cure of More of the 
Same?‖, The Freeman, November, pp. 673-676. 
Bartlett B. (1982), ―The Conservative Critics of Reaganomics‖, The Intercollegiate 
Review, Fall/Winter, pp. 39-47. 
Blanchard O. (1987), ―Reaganomics‖, Economic Policy, 5, October, pp. 17-48. 
Boskin M. J. (1988), ―Tax Policy and Economic Growth: Lessons From the 
1980s‖, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, N. 4, Autumn, pp. 71-97. 
Buchanan J. M. (1985), Liberty, Market and State, New York, New York University 
Press. 
Coats W. L. Jr. (1983), ―Reaganomics and Deficits: A Response to Bruce Bar-
tlett‖, The Intercollegiate Review, Fall, pp. 45-49. 
Cowen T. (1980), ―Supply-Side Economics: Another View‖, Policy Report, August, 
pp. 5-7. 
Cowen T. (1981), ―A Walk on the Supply-Side‖, Libertarian Review, August, pp. 44-
47. 
Danziger S. (1983), ―Budget Cuts as Welfare Reform‖, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 73, No. 2, May, pp. 65-70. 
Ebeling R. M. (1980), ―Some Thoughts on Supply-Side Economics‖, The Liberta-
rian Forum, May/June, pp. 3-7. 
Feldstein M. (ed., 1994), American Economic Policy in the 1980s, University of Chica-
go Press, Chicago. 
Gordon R. (1985), ―Understanding Inflation in the 1980s‖, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 16(1). 
Hausman J. A., Poterba J. M. (1987), ―Household Behavior and the Tax Reform 
The Economic Policy of Ronald Reagan 
COSIMO MAGAZZINO 
 
- 21 - 
Act of 1986‖, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 101-120. 
Horwich G. (1982), ―Reaganomics: A Philosophical and Almost Midterm Pers-
pective‖, Research in Agricultural and Applied Economics. 
Joskow P. L., Noll R. G. (1985), ―Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Over-
view‖, in Fromm G. (ed.), Studies in Public Regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 1-65. 
Koop G. (2004), Analysis of Economic Data, Wiley, Oxford. 
Kudlow L. (1998), ―Reaganomics: What Worked? What Didn’t?‖, American Expe-
riment Quarterly, Spring, pp. 73-85. 
Lucas R. E. (1981), ―Deficit Finance and Inflation‖, New York Times, August 26, p. 
D2. 
Marris S. N. (1985), ―The Decline and Fall of the Dollar: Some Policy Issues‖, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, N. 1, pp. 237-244. 
Médaille J. (2007), ―The Myth of Reaganomics‖, The Distributist Review, Friday, July 
27. 
Miller P. J. (1980), ―Deficit Policies, Deficit Fallacies‖, Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis – Quarterly Review, Summer, pp. 2-4. 
Miller P. J., Struthers A. Jr. (1980), ―The Tax Cut Illusion‖, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis – 1979 Annual Report, pp. 1-9. 
Mills G. B., Palmer J. L. (1983), The deficit dilemma: Budget policy in the Reagan era, The 
Urban Institute Press, Washington. 
Modigliani F. (1988), ―Reagan’s Economic Policies: A Critique‖, Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 40, N. 3, September, pp. 397-426. 
Modigliani F., Modigliani A. (1987), ―The Growth of Federal Deficit and the Role 
of Public Attitudes‖, Public Opinion Quarterly, 51. 
Niskanen W. A. (1988), Reaganomics: An insider’s account of the policies and the people, 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
Orzechowski W. (1991), ―Reaganomics and the use of collective rebates‖, Public 
Choice, Vol. 69, N. 3, March, pp. 311-322. 
Palmer J. L., Sawhill I. V. (eds., 1982), The Reagan experiment: An examination of eco-
nomic and social policies under the Reagan administration, The Urban Institute Press, 
Washington. 
Reagan R. W. (1981), Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan 1981, US Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington DC. 
Rothbard M. N. (2004), ―The Myths of Reaganomics‖, Mises Daily, Wednesday, 
June 9. 
Sennholz H. F. (1980), ―Professor Hans F. Sennholz Examines Supply-Side Eco-
nomics‖, The Review of the News, September 20, pp. 53-58. 
Smyth D. T., Dua P. (1988), ―Public Perceptions of Macroeconomic Policy: An 
Econometric Analysis of the Reagan Presidency‖, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 70, No. 2, May, pp. 357-361. 
Stockman D. (1986), The Triumph of Politics, Harper & Row, New York. 
The Economic Policy of Ronald Reagan 
COSIMO MAGAZZINO 
 
- 22 - 
Stubblebine W. C., Willett T. D. (eds., 1983), Reaganomics: A midterm report, ICS 
Press, San Francisco. 
Taylor J. B. (1995), ―Changes in American Economic Policy in the 1980s: Wa-
tershed or Pendulum Swing?‖, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 33, N. 2, June, 
pp. 777-784. 
Throop A. W. (1991), ―Fiscal Policy in the Reagan Years: A Burden on Future 
Generations?‖, Economic Review, N. 1, Winter. 
Valli V. (2010), L’economia Americana da Roosevelt a Obama, Carocci, Roma. 
Viscusi W. K. (1982), ―Health and Safety‖, Regulation, January/February, pp. 34-
36. 
Weintraub S., Goodstein M. (eds., 1983), Reaganomics in the stagflation economy, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. 
Zinam O. (1982), ―A note on Reaganomics‖, Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 10, N. 
4, December, p. 98. 
 
